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I. International Law & Its Applicability to Detention
Policies
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has long held that its
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution trumps aspects of
international law,' the ongoing international conflict stemming
from the events of September 11, 2001 (hereinafter 9/11) has put
the United States at the forefront of international debate. In
addressing the detention cases arising out of post-9/11 U.S.
military operations, it is important to understand how the Supreme
Court treats international law and perceives international
obligations under treaty law. Considering the evolving detention
cases as a whole, it becomes clear that the U.S. judiciary has
woven a complex system by selectively incorporating aspects of
international law while calling on the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution to avoid other international law.2
In June 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court made the unprecedented
decision to extend the constitutional right of habeas corpus to
individuals held outside the United States.' The writ of habeas
corpus is one of the most important individual liberties in the
American legal system.' Used to challenge the basis of
government detention, the writ literally compels the government to
"produce the body" of the accused so that a court "may inquire
into the basis of [his or her] detention."' Wary of a repressive
executive, the Founding Fathers carefully inserted the privilege
into the U.S. Constitution notwithstanding the idea of a future Bill
of Rights.6
Just as the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus was to protect
1 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 2
(2006) (suggesting that because "international and foreign law is important to the
jurisprudence of the modem Supreme Court," it does not "trump" the U.S. Constitution).
2 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International
Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1773-74 (2009) ("[S]ome extremely important treaties, central
to the regime of international law . . . are explicitly part of U.S. law.").
3 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 724 (2008).
4 Justin D. D'Aloia, From Baghdad to Bagram: The Length & Strength of the
Suspension Clause After Boumediene, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 957, 961 (2010) ("The writ
has always been justly regarded as the stable bulwark of civil liberty." (quoting In re
Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 147 (1852))).
5 Id.
6 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739.
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an individual against a repressive executive in the domestic
sphere, the framers of the Geneva Conventions sought to design an
international framework for safeguarding individuals during
international conflicts.' The four Geneva Conventions created a
system of rules and regulations by which nations were to abide in
the conduct of armed conflict.' While the writ of habeas corpus is
part of the bedrock of American domestic law, the Geneva
Conventions do not enjoy the same stalwart respect in the
international community.
In Boumediene v. Bush,'o the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether detainees held at the Guantanamo Naval Base
in southern Cuba had a right to "the constitutional privilege of
habeas corpus, a privilege not to be withdrawn except in
conformance with the Suspension Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2."" The
Court held that the Suspension Clause 2 of "the Constitution has
full effect at Guantanamo Bay. If the privilege of habeas corpus is
to be denied to the detainees ... before [the Court], Congress must
act in accordance with the requirements of the Suspension
Clause."" The ruling meant that for the first time, the nearly 300
foreign nationals being held at the Guantanamo detention facility
had the right to file a petition for habeas corpus in a federal district
court.'4 From an international law perspective, notably absent was
7 See Aya Gruber, Who's Afraid of Geneva Law?, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017, 1025
(2007) ("tT]he majority of Geneva's articles contain mandatory language about
protecting individual rights.").
8 Melysa H. Sperber, John Walker Lindh and Yaser Esam Hamdi: Closing the
Loophole in International Humanitarian Law for American Nationals Captured Abroad
While Fighting with Enemy Forces, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 159, 173-74 (2003) ("[T]he
essential purpose of all four Conventions is 'to provide minimum protections, standards
of humane treatment, and fundamental guarantees of respect to individuals who become
victims of armed conflicts."' (citations omitted)).
9 See Imogen Foulkes, Geneva Conventions' Struggle for Respect, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 12, 2009, 2:48am), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8196166.stm.
10 Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723.
11 Id. at 732.
12 The full text of the Suspension Clause reads: "The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
13 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
14 James Thomburg, Aliens Detained at Guantanamo Bay Have a Constitutional
Right to File Habeas Corpus Petitions in Federal Court: Boumediene v. Bush, 47 DUQ.
L. REV. 179, 181 (2009) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court ... held that the detainees did have a
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a discussion of the detainees' rights with respect to the Geneva
Conventions or other international treaty law.' 5  Instead, the
Supreme Court resolved the Boumediene case entirely upon
constitutional, domestic law.'"
Although the United States operates detention facilities in Iraq
and Afghanistan, among other places, the Boumediene decision
only addressed the narrow question of whether the detainees held
at Guantanamo Bay, a military base considered to be within the
United States, were allowed to file a petition for habeas corpus to
contest their detention." While the Boumediene decision did not
address the availability of the constitutional privilege for the writ
of habeas corpus, the Court's decision did provide a three-part
balancing test to assess whether non-citizen detainees would be
able to exercise the protections of the great writ.'8
Al Maqaleh v. Gates" represents the first time that U.S. federal
courts have applied the three-factor test laid out in Boumediene.20
Under former President George W. Bush, the government position
was that habeas did not "extend beyond Guantanamo" Bay.2' The
Obama Administration has "embraced" this view despite the new
president's "narrower claims for presidential detention power."2 2
Whereas the district court opinion found that habeas corpus should
extend to the Al Maqaleh detainees held at Bagram Airfield in
Afghanistan, the D.C. Circuit Court under de novo review ruled
that habeas did not reach Bagram.2 3 Jeh Johnson, General Counsel
of the U.S. Department of Defense, stated that the D.C. Circuit
opinion was the most important court case of 2010 for the
Department of Defense.24  The case represents the next legal
constitutional right to file habeas petitions in federal court.").
15 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723.
16 See id.
17 Id. at 771.
18 Id at 766.
19 Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh 1), 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207-08 (D.D.C.
2009).
20 Id.
21 Lyle Denniston, No Habeas Rights at Bagram, SCOTUSBLOG (May 21, 2010,
10:38 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/05/no-habeas-at-bagram/.
22 Id
23 Id.
24 Jeh Johnson, Panel I - Exec. Update on Developments in National Law, ABA
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chapter in the evolving line of detention cases arising out of post-
9/11 U.S. military operations abroad.2 5 The Al Maqaleh decision
is also a good example of how the United States, while using
international law as a touchstone, divests itself of some
international law considerations because certain American
constitutional provisions trump the consideration and importance
of the international issues.26
To begin the analysis of the Al Maqaleh habeas decisions at
the district court and circuit court levels, it is important to
understand the origins of the writ of habeas corpus in American
law and how the writ has come to be understood by American
courts in the international context. Section II of this article
provides a general overview of this progression. Beginning by
addressing how the post-9/11 world has drastically altered the
context in which the writ is analyzed, this section also discusses
the Boumediene v. Bush and Al Maqaleh v. Gates decisions.27
Section III then provides a historical treatment of the origins of the
writ of habeas corpus and how it is incorporated (or not)
extraterritorially through the Suspension Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.2 8 A discussion of two pivotal Supreme Court cases,
Johnson v. Eisentrager and Boumediene v. Bush, also fleshes out
the foundation for the legal analysis of the Al Maqaleh
petitioners.29
Section IV then provides an in-depth analysis of the Al
Maqaleh petitioners as well as judicial opinions issued by both the
D.C. District Court and the D.C. Circuit Court.30 Although the
STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY (Nov. 4, 2010),
http://www.americanbar.org/ghoups/public services/law-national-security/events cle/p
ast annual review conferences.html.
25 Luke R. Nelson, Territorial Sovereignty and the Evolving Boumediene Factors:
Al Maqaleh v. Gates and the Future of Detainee Habeas Corpus Rights, 9 U. N.H. L.
REv. 297, 311 (2011) ("The case law development from Eisentrager to Al Maqaleh
illustrates an evolving standard in extraterritorial habeas jurisprudence.").
26 See Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1764 (2009)
(raising questions regarding the interaction between U.S. constitutional law and
international law).
27 See infra Part L.A-B.
28 See infra Part IIA-B.
29 See infra Part I1.B.
30 See infra Part 11I.A-D.
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district court concluded that, following Boumediene, the writ of
habeas corpus was available to the Al Maqaleh petitioners, Chief
Judge Sentelle, writing for the D.C. Circuit Court, held, on de
novo review, that the writ did not extend to the Al Maqaleh
petitioners held at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan." This section
also addresses why Chief Judge Sentelle's opinion is the right
result and why the circuit court approach to the habeas question is
the correct line of analysis.32
Finally, Section V provides a look at the likely endgame for
the Al Maqaleh petitioners in light of the D.C. Circuit opinion.33
This article then concludes by looking at the implications of the Al
Maqaleh decision and how future petitioners are likely to fare in
similar situations.3 4 In looking toward the future of habeas corpus
litigation, this article also notes that while the functional approach
to analyzing petitions for habeas corpus was a useful mechanism
for determining both the Boumediene and Al Maqaleh cases, the
functional approach still leaves something to be desired. In the
end, functionality does not equal finality and closure to habeas
litigation.
II. Detention Cases in an International Context
"The U.S. military adheres to a historical legal precedent and
framework regarding the capture and detention of foreign enemies
engaged in hostilities against the United States."" For much of
the past fifty years, whenever the United States "engag[ed] in
overseas wars, capturing prisoners, and holding them in overseas
and domestic camps controlled by U.S. forces ... [T]hese
detainees [were] entitled to the panoply of legal protections
afforded by international law, primarily the Geneva
Conventions."3 6 The post-9/11 operational environment has lead
to several changes in the U.S. position on certain types of
31 See infra Part III.C.
32 See infra Part III.D.
33 See infra Part IV.
34 See infra Part IV.
35 Colonel Fred K. Ford, Keeping Boumediene Off the Battlefield: Examining
Potential Implications of the Boumediene v. Bush Decision to the Conduct of United
States Military Operations, 30 PACE L. REV. 396, 397 (2010).
36 Id.
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detainees. While many detainees held by the United States have
not received the same Geneva Conventions coverage as in past
wars, the new detainees have, in some instances, been afforded
procedural protections never before granted to detainees who were
located outside U.S. borders.37 Boumediene v. Bush marked the
change in the "legal landscape."" The case marked the first time
that detainees held abroad received the privilege of habeas
corpus." While the Boumediene decision was limited to detainees
held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Al Maqaleh v. Gates could
possibly extend the Boumediene rule to some detainees held at
Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan.40
A. Boumediene v. Bush
Writing as amici curiae in support of the Boumediene
petitioners, several international law professors stressed the
enforceability of the Geneva Conventions as applied to
Boumediene.4 1 Providing a "historical overview of the
enforceability of treaty-based rights in U.S. courts," the amici
asserted that the Boumediene petitioners should have been able to
draw upon treaty law in their defense.42 The first part of the amici
argument was that the court had already determined under
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld" that the Geneva Conventions were
enforceable by detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.44 Amici
stressed that the "availability of [petitioner's use of] habeas corpus
for treaty-based claims" stems from the Constitution's Supremacy
37 See id.
38 Id. at 397-98.
39 Id.
40 See Ford, supra note 35, at 396-97 ("[T]he Court's decision has implications in
two general areas: (1) the application of the habeas right to foreign fighters detained in
locations other than Guantanamo Bay; and (2) the application of other constitutional and
statutory rights to persons stopped or detained by U.S. military forces during military
operations.").
41 Brief of Federal Courts and International Law Professors as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 4, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195,
06-1196), 2007 WL 2441588 at *2 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners].
42 Id. at 4, 2007 WL 2441588, at *1-2.
43 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
44 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 41, at 5, 2007 WL 2441588, at *5.
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Clause.4 5 Habeas is, therefore, "consistent with - and compelled
by-the Constitution's Supremacy Clause" because the
Constitution holds treaties in a high regard, "plac[ing] treaties
alongside statutes and the Constitution as the 'supreme Law of the
Land."' 46 Based upon this assertion, the amici felt that the idea
that treaty sources could extend habeas to the petitioners at
Guantanamo Bay via federal statutes and the Constitution was
"beyond question."4 7 Addressing the issue of non-self executing
treaties, the amici pointed to previous Supreme Court precedent
showing that habeas had generally been available where the treaty
establishing the right "did not create a private right of action" for
individuals.4 8
As to the government position on the U.S. implementation of
the four Geneva Conventions, amici asserted that, "because the
crux of Respondents' argument is that the detention of Petitioners
is recognized and justified by the laws of war, such an argument
necessarily presupposes that the Authorization for the Use of
Military Force ("AUMF")49 incorporates that same body of law" in
its analysis.o This assertion is given weight by Justice
O'Connor's treatment of the Hamdi case in her plurality opinion.
In Hamdi, Justice O'Connor illustrated that,
because the [AUMF] authorizes the use of military force in acts
of war by the United States, the [government's] argument goes,
it is reasonably clear that the military and its Commander in
Chief are authorized to deal with enemy belligerents according
to the treaties and customs known collectively as the laws of
war.52
45 Id at 6, 2007 WL 2441588, at *7.
46 Id. at 6, 2007 WL 2441588, at *7 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 6, 2007 WL 2441588, at *7-8 (citing Chew Heong v. United States, 112
U.S. 536 (1884)) (granting habeas relief to a Chinese laborer where the laborer's cause
of action was not the result of a private action created by an 1880 treaty between China
and the United States).
49 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2001).
50 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 41, at 7, 2007 WL 2441588, at *10.
51 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 548-49 (2004).
52 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 41, at 7, 2007 WL 2441588, at *10 (citing
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 548-49).
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Once this finding was established, the question remained
"whether the [Military Commissions Act] MCA subsequently
rejected the implementation of the laws of war" as read into the
AUMF.53 In addressing this question, amici for the petitioners
found highly relevant that international treaty law has historically
not been repealed based on statutory language that only has an
implied repeal. In addition to pointing out that nothing in the
MCA explicitly repealed any portion of the Geneva Conventions,
the MCA also seemed to have explicit language endorsing
international treaty obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
For instance, under section 6 of the MCA, dealing with the
"Implementation of Treaty Obligations," the MCA specifically
addresses the "extent to which violations of the Geneva
Conventions remain actionable pursuant to the War Crimes
Act"."56 Additionally, section 3 of the MCA states that all the
"necessary 'judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples' for purposes of common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions" should apply." These
specific parts of the MCA indicate that "Congress's intent was not
to 'un-execute' the Geneva Conventions or even to 'un-
implement' the treaty obligations" previously identified in
Hamdan."
B. Al Maqaleh v. Gates
Many of the claims from the amici curiae brief written on
behalf of the Boumediene petitioners hold true for the Al Maqaleh
petitioners as well. Numerous scholars of international law
maintain that the rules concerning detention under international
law are perfectly clear: "civilian non-combatants may not be
seized far from the battlefield and held indefinitely without
53 Id. at 11, 2007 WL 2441588, at *20-21 [hereinafter MCA].
54 See id. at 12, 2007 WL 2441588, at *23 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984)).
55 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2008).
56 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 41, at 8, 2007 WL 2441588, at *11.
57 Id. at 8, 2007 WL 2441588, at *12.
58 Id. at 8, 2007 WL 2441588, at *12 (citations omitted).
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judicial review, even if designated as 'enemy combatants."' 5 9
Furthermore, these scholars writing as amici on behalf of Al
Maqaleh and his three fellow petitioners believe that the circuit
court opinion subverts "the fundamental human rights norms
developed over hundreds of years."o Based upon the fact that all
remaining Al Maqaleh petitioners were "seiz[ed] in peaceful
zones," international human rights law should govern the analysis
of the case.6' The amici view the specific facts of the remaining Al
Maqaleh petitioners-apprehension abroad and subsequent
rendition to Afghanistan-as a sinister procedure designed to
"switch the Constitution on or off at will." 62
In addressing the Boumediene precedent with regard to
analyzing the Al Maqaleh petitioners, the Boumediene extension
of habeas corpus rights represented to some international law
scholars the U.S. recognition of a fundamental human right -
freedom from arbitrary, indefinite detention. 63 British courts had
previously recognized that the writ of habeas corpus is a "flexible
remedy adaptable to changing circumstances."6 4 While the
Supreme Court had made similar assertions in past cases, stating
that "[h]abeas corpus is not a static, narrow, formalistic remedy,
but one which must retain the ability to cut through barriers of
form and procedural mazes,",65 Boumediene represented the first
time that the "procedural maze" applied to aliens held outside the
United States.66 Based on the evolving trend of international
humanitarian law and the Boumediene extension of habeas to
detainees at Guantanamo Bay, many human rights scholars felt
59 Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of International Human Rights Law and
Related Subjects in Support of Petitioners-Appellees at 3, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d
84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 09-5265), 2009 WL 6043975 at *9 [hereinafter Amicus Brief]
(emphasis in original).
60 Id, 2009 WL 6043975, at *9.
61 Id at 14, 2009 WL 6043975, at *20.
62 Id at 6, 2009 WL 6043975, at *3 (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765).
63 See id. at 9, 2009 WL 6043975, at *9.
64 Amicus Brief, supra note 59, at 9, 2009 WL 6043975, at *9 (citations omitted).
65 See id., 2009 WL 6043975, at *9 (citations omitted) (quoting Hensley v. Mun.
Ct., San Jose Milpitas Judicial Dist., Santa Clara County, Cal., 411 U.S. 345, 349-50
(1973)).
66 See D'Aloia, supra note 4, at 977.
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that the Al Maqaleh district court opinion should be affirmed."
Such an affirmance would represent "a more nuanced
understanding of the writ, already recognized by U.S.
jurisprudence."6 8
Addressing the actual detention of the Al Maqaleh petitioners,
the amici point to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("UDHR") in its statement that "[n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile."69  Additionally, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), to
which the United States is a signatory, states in article 9(1) that,
"[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance
with such procedure as are established by law."o
The drafting history of article 9(1) of the ICCPR also evinces
that "'arbitrariness' is not to be equated with 'against the law,' but
must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of
inappropriateness, injustice or lack of predictability."" As such,
detention should never be "unjust, unreasonable, or infringe upon
human dignity."7 2 In ratifying the ICCPR, however, the United
States only approved the agreement with certain "reservations,
understandings, and declarations" ("RUDs"), including that
articles 1 to 27 would be nonself-executing in the United States.
Therefore, regarding the American detention process, an
investigation into the degree of procedure afforded to a detainee
would be very important in determining the legal viability of the
system within the framework of the ICCPR and international
humanitarian law more generally.74 It is possible that an
67 See Amicus Brief, supra note 59, at 9, 2009 WL 6043975, at *9.
68 Id., 2009 WL 6043975, at *9.
69 Id., 2009 WL 6043975, at *10 (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A, art. 9, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948)).
70 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, Dec. 16, 1966,
1916 U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
71 Amicus Brief, supra note 59, at 9-10, 2009 WL 6043975, at * 11-12 (citations
omitted).
72 Id. at 10, 2009 WL 6043975, at *12.
73 See id. at 9-10, 2009 WL 6043975, at *10-11 n.38.
74 See id at 9-11, 2009 WL 6043975, at *10-14 (discussing the American
reservations to the ICCPR and how "[c]ontemporary international human rights law
2011] 521
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invalidation of the U.S. detention policy may occur when analyzed
from an international law perspective; however, the RUDs that the
United States made in ratifying the ICCPR would likely render the
U.S. procedure permissible under domestic law."
Notwithstanding, the ICCPR remains binding on the United States
as a treaty ratified by the Senate. It is, therefore, arguable that
the ICCPR "obliges the President and Congress faithfully to
implement it."77 This argument is even greater "where, as here,
[the ICCPR] embod[ies] binding principles of customary
international law."7 8
The prohibition against indefinite detention under international
humanitarian law is only the baseline of procedural process. In
order to ensure that "a detention is not arbitrary, international
human rights law guarantees a right to meaningful review." 79 As
part of this review process, "any individual - other than a
combatant captured on the battlefield - who is arrested or detained
has the rights to appear before a court without delay, to ask the
court to determine the legality of detention, and to be released if
the detention is unlawful."so Here, petitioner Al Bakri "has been
denied the right to appear before the military panel that determined
his status and was not given access to counsel or to evidence.""1 If
the degree of procedure afforded to the Al Maqaleh detainees were
the only issue before the court, it may be more likely that the
courts would recognize that "the Executive has proceeded against
Petitioners in a manner that is contradictory to both the letter and
the spirit of the ICCPR." 8 2
III. Origins of the Great Writ
Historians often describe the writ of habeas corpus as a
clearly prohibits arbitrary detention").
75 See id. at 9-10, 2009 WL 6043975, at *10- 11 n.38 (explaining that articles I
through 12 are not self-executing in the United States).
76 See Amicus Brief, supra note 59, at 13, 2009 WL 6043975, at *13.
77 Id., 2009 WL 6043975, at *18-19.
78 See id., 2009 WL 6043975, at *19.
79 Id. at 11, 2009 WL 6043975, at *14-15 (emphasis in original).
80 Id., 2009 WL 6043975, at *15 (citing ICCPR, supra note 70, art. 9(4)).
81 Amicus Brief, supra note 59, at 16, 2009 WL 6043975, at *24.
82 Id. at 13, 2009 WL 6043975, at *19.
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"bulwark" of individual liberty in the scheme of American rights.8 3
The American legal system inherited the writ from common law
under which it had been used to challenge the legal basis for
detention." The writ commands a detaining authority to "produce
the body"" of a prisoner before a court so that the court may make
a determination as to the legality of the detention.86 The Founding
Fathers were well aware of the importance of the writ, and they
sought to ensure the continued use of the writ under the new
American Constitution.87 The "protection for the habeas privilege
was one of the few safeguards of liberty specified in a Constitution
that, at the outset, had no Bill of Rights."" The framers of the
Constitution explicitly incorporated the right within the
Suspension Clause." The clause stipulates that "[t]he Privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."9 0
The writ is "currently codified in section 2241 of the judicial
code."9 1 Although the writ has evolved from its common law
origins and now covers additional restraints on liberty, the writ has
historically always been a check on executive power.9 2 Its central
purpose is to ensure that the Executive only detains individuals in
accordance with the law.93 The recent post-9/11 line of habeas
83 D'Aloia, supra note 4, at 961 (citing In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 147
(1852) (Nelson, J., dissenting) ("The writ has always been justly regarded as the stable
bulwark of civil liberty."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 512 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (arguing that habeas corpus is a bulwark against
arbitrary punishment).
84 D'Aloia, supra note 4, at 962-63 (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004)
("Habeas corpus ... throw[s] its root deep into the genius of our common law." (quoting
Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 484 n.2 (1945)))).
85 The term "habeas corpus" literally means "that you have the body." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 778 (9th ed. 2009).
86 See D'Aloia, supra note 4, at 961.
87 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739.
88 Id. at 725.
89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
90 Id
91 D'Aloia, supra note 4, at 965 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)).
92 See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973) ("[O]ver the years, the
writ of habeas corpus evolved as a remedy available to effect discharge from any
confinement contrary to the Constitution or fundamental law.").
93 See D'Aloia, supra note 4, at 967.
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cases concerning detained enemy combatants has tested the
strength of the writ and put the three branches of the federal
government at odds over how far and to whom the writ should
extend.94
A. Prelude to Expanding the Great Writ
Since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, the United States has been engaged in an ongoing
conflict against radical jihadist Islam; this conflict has given rise to
several American-operated military detention facilities across the
globe.95 Perhaps the most well-known detainment facility is
located in Cuba at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station.9 6 The
Executive branch derives its detention powers largely from the
Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF"), a document
promulgated by the U.S. Congress that gives the Executive the
power to do the following:
[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons,
in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons.97
On September 18, 2001, only one week after the 9/11 attacks,
Congress approved the AUMF.98 For over eighteen months,
American detention practices at Guantanamo Bay and other
94 See generally Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal
Courts an Essay in Honor of Henry Monaghan, 110 CoLUM. L. REv. 579 (2010)
(outlining issues surrounding habeas corpus and detention since 9/11).
95 Detention facilities still in operation exist in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Station in southern Cuba. D'Aloia, supra note 4 (giving
examples of detention facilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo Bay throughout
his piece). President Obama ordered the decommissioning of all CIA detention facilities
still in use at the beginning of his presidency. See id. at 983-96.
96 See id at 985-88 (describing the Guantanamo Bay detention facility and the
worldwide criticism it has garnered).
97 Authorization for Use of Military Force. § 1541.
98 See id
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detention facilities went virtually unchallenged.99 In 2004, the
Supreme Court upheld the Executive's power to detain individual
enemy combatants as "so fundamental and accepted an incident to
war as to be an exercise of 'necessary and appropriate force'
under the AUMF.'o
The first initial check on the Executive's post-9/11 detention
powers came in another 2004 case, Rasul v. Bush.'O' In Rasul,
enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay filed petitions for
habeas corpus.'0 2 In a plurality opinion, the Court held that the
alien detainees held at Guantanamo Bay had a statutory right to
invoke federal habeas corpus.'0 3  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,'" the
Supreme Court held that due process rights required that a U.S.
citizen being held as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful
opportunity to contest the factual basis for his detention. In
response to the Rasul decision, the Department of Defense ordered
the creation of Combatant Status Review Tribunals ("CSRT"); the
CSRTs provided a formal mechanism for reviewing the status of
each "enemy combatant" detainee.'o Congress supported the
creation of the CSRTs and formally supplemented the Department
of Defense action with the enactment of the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 ("DTA").' 06  The DTA addressed several matters
related to detainees, including the relevant test for determining the
legality of an alien's detention.'0 o More importantly, however, the
DTA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2241, stripping Article III federal
courts of jurisdiction to hear petitions for habeas corpus from
detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, like the petitioner in Rasul.'0o
99 See D'Aloia, supra note 4, at 999.
100 Id. (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518).
101 See id.
102 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
103 See D'Aloia, supra note 4, at 999-1000 (citing Rasul, 542 U.S. at 481, "[A]liens
held at the bases ... are entitled to invoke the federal courts' authority under [28 U.S.C.]
§ 2241.").
104 Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507.
105 See D'Aloia, supra note 4, at 1000.
106 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 28 U.C.S. § 2241 (2005) amended by
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 28 U.C.S. § 2241 (2005).
107 See Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 212.
108 The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 amended the federal habeas statute (28
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The DTA gave formal statutory recognition to the CSRTs and
specified that the CSRT would be the official substitute for Article
III habeas review.'09 The DTA also amended section 2241 to give
limited Article III court review solely to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia."o
Although the DTA precluded potential future litigants held at
Guantanamo Bay from petitioning Article III courts for habeas
review, the statute left open the question as to whether the DTA
mooted habeas cases that were pending at the time of its
enactment."' In 2006, the Supreme Court took up the issue in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld."12  The Court held that, "[o]rdinary
principles of statutory construction" rebutted the idea that section
1005(e) of the DTA applied to cases pending before the Court
during the enactment of the DTA.1' In another act of reactive
legislation, Congress passed the MCA"4 in order to void this
legal gap."' '5 MCA § 7(a) explicitly and retroactively applied the
provisions of the DTA which stripped Article III courts of
jurisdiction against all pending cases."16
U.S.C. § 2241), adding section 2241(e). The section states, "no court, justice, or judge
shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . .. an application for a writ of habeas corpus
filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba." See Detainee Treatment Act; see also D'Aloia, supra note 4, at 999-1000
(outlining Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), and explaining that petitioner was held at
Guantanamo Bay).
109 See Detainee Treatment Act (outlining jurisdictional rules for habeas review in
the section titled "Procedures for Status Review of Detainees Outside the United
States").
110 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) (2006), amended by Detainee Treatment Act (stating in §
1005(e)(1) that the "United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any final decision of a
[CSRT] that an alien is properly detained as an enemy combatant").
IlII See Detainee Treatment Act.
112 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
113 See id at 575-76.
114 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006) (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter MCA].
115 D'Aloia, supra note 4, at 1001; see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 738 ("[T]he
MCA was a direct response to Hamdan's holding that the DTA's jurisdiction-stripping
provision had no application to pending cases.").
116 MCA § 7(a)-(b) (amending § 2241(e) to read: "No court, justice, or judge shall
have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or
on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the
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B. The Extraterritorial Reach of the Suspension Clause
The congressional reaction to the Rasul decision firmly closed
the door for detainees held at Guantanamo Bay desiring to assert a
statutory right to habeas corpus."' With the enactment of MCA,
however, the question remained open as to the availability of
constitutional habeas to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay and
elsewhere outside the United States."' Prior to the Al Maqaleh
decisions, two Supreme Court cases squarely addressed the
availability of constitutional habeas as applied to individuals held
outside U.S. territory." 9 The first, Johnson v. Eisentrager,120 was
a post-World War II case involving German saboteurs. The
second case, Boumediene v. Bush,121 involved alien detainees held
at Guantanamo Bay. These two cases provide a vital framework
for understanding both the district and appellate court opinions
regarding Al Maqaleh.'2 2
1. Johnson v. Eisentrager
Prior to the contemporary Guantanamo Bay habeas cases, the
Supreme Court had only once examined the extraterritorial reach
of habeas corpus. 12 In Johnson v. Eisentrager, 124 allied forces
captured German saboteurs and repatriated them to an American-
operated prison in Landsberg, Germany.125 The German saboteurs
filed petitions for habeas corpus on both statutory and
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination") (emphasis added).
117 See Al Maqaleh v. Gates (Al Maqaleh II), 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(explaining that in response to the Rasul decision, Congress passed the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005).
118 See Boitmediene, 553 U.S. at 736 (addressing the issue of the availability of
Constitutional habeas to detainees held outside the United States).
119 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); see also Boumediene, 553 U.S.
723.
120 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763.
121 Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723.
122 See Al Maqaleh H1, 605 F.3d 84 (taking into account both Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763, and Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723).
123 See D'Aloia, supra note 4, at 1003-04.
124 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763.
125 See id. at 766.
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constitutional grounds.126 The Eisentrager petitioners "had been
convicted by a military commission in China of 'engaging in,
permitting or ordering continued military activity against the
United States after the surrender of Germany and before the
surrender of Japan."'" 27 As such, the Eisentrager petitioners were
unlawful combatants in violation of the law of war.128 Petitioners
were "captured in China, tried in China, and repatriated to
Germany to serve sentences in Landsberg Prison, a facility under
the control of the United States as part of the Allied Powers' post-
war occupation."' 2 9 The Court held "that the Constitution does not
confer a right of personal security or an immunity from military
trial and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile
service of a government at war with the United States."'"0 The
Court found that "[n]othing in the text of the Constitution extends
such a right.""' Furthermore, to grant such a right to the saboteurs
would extend the habeas right to a detainee who:
(a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United
States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there held in
military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and
convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United
States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside
the United States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned outside the
United States.132
In addition to addressing the standing issue, the Eisentrager
Court highlighted concerns it had over extending habeas and how
it might interfere with an ongoing military occupation.'3 3 The
Court foresaw that such an extension of rights would create a
heavy burden on American resources that would be better directed
126 See id. at 765-66.
127 Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 89 (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 766).
128 See id.
129 Id. (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 766).
130 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 785.
131 Id. at 768.
132 Id. at 777.
133 See id. at 784.
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at continuing the war effort. 3 4 Taking into account the saboteurs'
standing issue and the practical problems that extending habeas
would create for the war effort, the Court concluded that the
detainees did not have access to habeas corpus.3 5
2. Boumediene v. Bush
In 2008, the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush revisited
the question of constitutional habeas as applied to detainees held at
Guantanamo Bay.'36  Despite the statutory jurisdiction-stripping
provisions of MCA section 7(a),'3 7 the Boumediene petitioners
"challenged their [CSRT] designation as enemy combatants by
asserting a common law right to habeas corpus.""' The Court
held that the petitioners did have access to the privilege of habeas
corpus and section 7(a) of the MCA was an unconstitutional
suspension of the writ.'39 The decision marked the first time that
non-U.S. citizens who had never before been present in the United
States and who had been designated as "enemy combatants" by the
United States had the constitutional right to habeas review.'40 in
so holding, the Court established that the Suspension Clause had
"full effect at Guantanamo Bay." 4 ' In reaching its conclusion, the
Court considered the factors relied upon in Eisentrager in
developing its own three-factor test for defining the extraterritorial
reach of the Suspension Clause.'42 The Boumediene Court
resolved that the following three factors are relevant to
determining the reach of the Suspension Clause:
(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of
the process through which that status determination was made;
(2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention
took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving
I34 See id at 779.
135 See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777.
136 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723.
137 See MCA, 10 U.S.C. § 948-49.
138 D'Aloia, supra note 4, at 1001.
139 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732-33.
140 See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 771.
141 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
142 See id. at 766.
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the prisoner's entitlement to the writ.143
The test was to represent a "functional approach" for
determining the reach of the Constitution.144 The newly crafted
functional framework allowed "questions of extraterritoriality [to]
turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism."l4 5
Under this analytical approach, the "Court observed that de jure
sovereignty in the strict legal sense was not outcome-
determinative for purposes of the writ of habeas corpus." 46
Instead, the Court found that the proper test was to "inquire into
the objective degree of control the Nation asserts over foreign
territory.
Although the Boumediene decision established that detainees
held at Guantanamo Bay had the privilege of habeas corpus, the
decision left open the habeas question as to detainees held
elsewhere outside the United States.148 With the resolution of the
Guantanamo Bay question, attention turned to American detention
sites elsewhere.149  Recently, the D.C. District Court and, on
appeal, the D.C. Court of Appeals undertook the issue in Al
Maqaleh v. Gates.' The issues surrounding the Al Maqaleh case
closely parallel the issues addressed in Boumediene, "in large part
because the detainees themselves as well as the rationale for
detention are essentially the same."'
IV. Whether Boumediene Reaches Bagram: Al Maqaleh
v. Gates
The Al Maqaleh case centers on the same issue that the
Supreme Court addressed in Boumediene-how far the
143 Id.
I44 See id.
145 Id. at 727.
146 D'Aloia, supra note 4, at 1003 (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 753).
147 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754.
148 See id. at 756 (noting that fundamental questions of constitutional scope outside
of the United States remain).
149 See Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (addressing the four aliens' challenge of
their detention in Afghanistan).
150 Id.; Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84.
151 Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 207.
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Suspension Clause reaches. 15 2 In Al Maqaleh, the Boumediene
question remains central-whether aliens who are detained abroad
during a time of conflict can assert the privilege of habeas
corpus.'15  However, the Al Maqaleh opinions yield opposing
results.154  While the D.C. District Court uses the Boumediene
framework to extend habeas to detainees at Bagram, the D.C.
Circuit undertakes the same Boumediene analysis and finds that
the privilege of habeas does not extend to Bagram.'15  Ultimately,
this paper argues the D.C. Circuit has the correct interpretation of
the Boumediene framework, and this interpretation is likely to be
adopted should the Supreme Court take up the case.
Because the D.C. Circuit reviewed Judge Bates's district court
opinion exercising de novo review upon a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court
and the D.C. Circuit Court opinions both represent viable legal
analyses that the Supreme Court may draw upon should it take up
the case.15 6 Both decisions regarding the Al Maqaleh petitioners
represent the first serious judicial attempts to apply the functional
approach laid out in Boumediene for determining the reach of the
Constitution.'15 In ruling on whether the D.C. District Court has
jurisdiction over the case, the Supreme Court may apply the legal
reasoning exhibited in Judge Bates's opinion,' Chief Judge
Sentelle's opinion,15 a combination thereof, or a completely new
line of reasoning.
To develop the competing analytical frameworks that the D.C.
District Court and the D.C. Circuit undertook in addressing the Al
Maqaleh petitioners, this paper first addresses Chief Judge
Sentelle's D.C. Circuit Court opinion.160  The circuit opinion
represents both the current status of the law and the legal
152 See id at 214.
153 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746-47.
'54 Compare Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 231-32, with Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d
at 95-99.
155 See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84.
156 See id. at 94.
157 See id.
158 See Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 207.
159 See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 87.
160 See id.
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determination that the Supreme Court would likely adopt should
the High Court receive and grant cert to a writ of certiorari from
the Al Maqaleh petitioners.' The paper will then present the
opposing legal determinations made in Judge Bates's district court
opinion and develop why these views are unlikely to be adopted
should the Supreme Court review the Al Maqaleh petitioners'
claims.
A. The Petitioners
Al Maqaleh v. Gates involves three petitioners'62 who are
currently held as unlawful enemy combatants at the Bagram
Theater Internment Facility on the Bagram Airfield Military Base
in Afghanistan.'63 Petitioner Fadi Al Maqaleh is a Yemeni citizen
who claims he was first taken into American custody sometime in
2003.164 Although Al Maqaleh asserts that he was captured
outside of Afghanistan, an American Commander of Detention
Operations asserts that Al Maqaleh was captured within
Afghanistan.'6 5 Amin Al Bakri is also a Yemeni citizen; he was
allegedly captured in Thailand in 2002.166 The third petitioner,
Redga Al Najar, is a Tunisian citizen who alleges being captured
in Pakistan in 2002.167 Family members filed habeas petitions for
each of the petitioners. 168
B. The Place ofDetention
"Bagram Airfield Military Base is the largest military facility
in Afghanistan occupied by United States and coalition forces."' 6 9
After the Rasul decision, the Bagram facility "became the
161 See id.
162 A fourth petition filed in the district court was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
and is, therefore, not subject to the D.C. Court of Appeal's interlocutory appeal. See id
at 87 n.1.
163 See id. at 87.
164 See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 87.
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 See id.
168 Brief for Petitioner-Appellees at 4-5, Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C
2009) (No. 09-5265), 2009 WL 6043974 at *2-4.
169 Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 87.
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preferred destination for indefinite detention."' The United
States entered into a lease agreement with the government of
Afghanistan that "consigns all facilities and land located at
Bagram Airfield . .. owned by [Afghanistan,] or Parwan Province,
or private individuals, or others, for use by the United States and
coalition forces for military purposes.""' The leasehold created
by the agreement "refers to Afghanistan as the 'host nation' and
the United States 'as the lessee."" 72 Additionally, the leasehold is
to continue "until the United States or its successors determine that
the premises are no longer required for its use."' 3
Afghanistan was an active theater of military combat at the
initiation of the Al Maqaleh litigation 74 and continues to be an
active theater today."' The United States continues to conduct
military operations from Bagram Airfield."' In addition to the
United States providing overall security at the airfield, other
coalition nations also operate on the base and control parts of the
airfield."' The coalition partners at present constitute both the
"American-led military coalition in Afghanistan" as well as the
NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)." As of
October 25, 2010, ISAF consisted of forty-eight troop-contributing
nations'79 with over 40,000 non-American forces deployed in
Afghanistan. so
170 D'Aloia, supra note 4, at 989-90 (citation omitted).
171 Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 87 (quoting the Accommodation Consignment
Agreement for Lands and Facilities at Bagram Airfield Between the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan and the United States of America) (internal quotation marks omitted).
172 Id
173 Id. at 87-88 (internal quotation marks omitted).
174 Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
175 See Al Maqaleh I, 605 F.3d at 88.
176 See id.
177 Id.
78 Id.
179 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures (Oct. 25,
2010),
http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/250CTI 0%20Placemat%20page
%201,2,3.pdf.
180 See id
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C. D.C. Circuit: Bagram is No Guantanamo Bay
In an opinion delivered by Chief Judge Sentelle,"'. the D.C.
Circuit Court held that "the jurisdiction of the courts to afford the
right to habeas relief and the protection of the Suspension Clause
does not extend to aliens held in executive detention in the
Bagram detention facility in the Afghan theater of war."' 82 This
holding, based on the circuit court's de novo review," means that
"foreign nationals held at a U.S. military prison at Bagram airbase
outside of Kabul, Afghanistan, do not have a right to challenge in
U.S. courts their continued imprisonment."' 8 4 The circuit court's
analysis in its decision was controlled by the "Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Constitution in Eisentrager as construed and
explained in the Court's more recent opinion in Boumediene."85
On interlocutory appeal as to the jurisdictional question,18 6 the
circuit court opinion was unanimous in striking down the district
court's ruling.' Of significance for possible Supreme Court
review, the unanimous panel consisted of jurists from across the
philosophical spectrum with Chief Judge David B. Sentelle,
considered a conservative jurist, being joined by two liberal
judges, Circuit Court Judge David S. Tatel and Senior Circuit
Judge Harry T. Edwards.'
In beginning its analysis of the Boumediene factors as applied
to the petitioners at Bagram, the circuit court rejected what it
considered to be "an extreme understanding" and "bright-line
arguments" that both parties drew from Boumediene.'"9 The
government asserted that Boumediene yielded a bright-line rule
that the "Boumediene analysis [had] no application beyond the
territories that are, like Guantanamo, outside the de jure
sovereignty of the United States but are subject to its de facto
181 See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 87.
182 Id. at 99.
183 Id. at 94.
184 Denniston, supra note 21.
185 Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 94.
186 Id. at 87.
187 See id. at 86.
188 See Denniston, supra note 21.
189 Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 94.
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sovereignty."" 0  The circuit court rejected the government's
argument because 1) the Boumediene Court had already "expressly
repudiated the argument ... [observing] that the Eisentrager Court
adopted a formalistic, sovereignty-based test for determining the
reach of the Suspension Clause,"' 9 ' and 2) the government's
narrow interpretation of the word "sovereignty"' 9 2 conflicted with
the general meaning given in Eisentrager, and 3) such a reading of
Eisentrager "would have been inconsistent" with the functional
questions of extraterritoriality that "unite" the Insular Cases with
"a common thread."1 93
Likewise, the circuit court also rejected the petitioners'
extreme position that the U.S. leasehold at Bagram is sufficient to
trigger a similar extraterritorial application of the Suspension
Clause as in Boumediene.'94 The circuit court felt that the natural
extension of this broad understanding of Boumediene would
implicate the "extraterritorial extension of the Suspension Clause
to noncitizens held in any United States military facility in the
world, and perhaps to an undeterminable number of other United
States-leased facilities as well."' 9 5 The circuit court reasoned that
if the Boumediene Court had intended such a "sweeping
application" of its ruling, it would have explicitly stated so. 96
Since Boumediene only applied to detainees held at Guantanamo
Bay, the circuit court found the petitioners' broad view of
Boumediene untenable.' 97 Upon dismissing both the government
190 Id
191 Id (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 762) (internal quotation marks omitted).
192 The government sought to limit the definition of "sovereignty" to the "narrow
technical sense," whereas the Eisentrager court clearly included "the degree of control
the military asserted over the facility." Id. (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 763)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
193 Id. at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted). The "Insular Cases" include, but are
not limited to, Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S.
197 (1903); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 1 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); and Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 (1901). D'Aloia, supra note 4, at 969 n.53. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I
(1957) (more contemporary example of the functional approach to examining questions
of extraterritoriality).
194 Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 94-95 (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 763-64).
195 Id. at 95.
I96 Id.
197 See id. at 95-96.
2011] 535
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
and petitioners' extreme understandings of Bournediene, the circuit
court carefully addressed the functional approach test as laid out in
Boumediene.'98
1. The Process for Deciding Who May Be Detained
The first factor of the Boumediene three-factor test is "the
citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the
process through which that status determination [has been]
made."' 9 9 In analyzing the first factor, the circuit court found that
the circumstances weigh in the petitioners' favor for finding the
right to habeas relief and having the Suspension Clause apply to
the Bagram petitioners as it had to the Guantanamo petitioners.20 0
The court divided its analysis of the first factor into separate
analyses of "citizenship and status" and "adequacy of process for
making status determination" inquiries.2 0 ' As to citizenship, the
court found that the Al Maqaleh petitioners differ "in no material
respect from the petitioners at Guantanamo who prevailed in
Boumediene;"2 02 likewise, the status of the Al Maqaleh petitioners
as enemy aliens mirrors that of the Boumediene petitioners.20
Looking to the adequacy of process for making the enemy alien
determination, the court found that the Al Maqaleh petitioners
have a much stronger case for invoking the writ because the
process afforded to the detainees at Bagram was much less
sophisticated than that of the Eisentrager saboteurs or even the
Boumediene detainees.20 4 Given the stark similarities among the
198 Id at 95.
199 Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 95 (internal quotation marks omitted).
200 Id. at 96.
201 Id. at 95-96.
202 Id. at 96.
203 Id.
204 See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 96. In addition to being charged with a "bill of
particulars" that laid out a detailed factual basis for the underlying charges, the
Eisentrager petitioners were entitled to "representation by counsel, allowed to introduce
evidence on their own behalf, and were permitted to cross-examine the prosecution's
witnesses." Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 767. A Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(CSRT) determined the Boumediene petitioners' status. Id. at 733. Under a CSRT, a
"Personal Representative," as opposed to legal counsel, advises an individual detainee.
Id. at 767. This representative is neither the detainee's lawyer nor advocate. Id. The
differences between a CSRT and the Eisentrager military tribunal procedures differed in
other aspects as well, and the Supreme Court stated in Boumediene that these differences
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Boumediene and Al Maqaleh detainees with regards to citizenship
and status, as well as the even greater inadequacy of process for
the Al Maqaleh detainees, the circuit court made the
uncontroversial finding that the first Boumediene factor weighs in
favor of the petitioners.205 This finding shows that the circuit court
has at least considered some of the aspects of the ICCPR and the
requisite procedure to be afforded to a detainee.20 6 Because no one
factor alone is outcome-determinative in Boumediene's three-
factor test,2 07 the fact that international law urges the extension of
the writ here does not mean that it will necessarily happen.
2. The Nature of the Site ofDetention
The second factor in the Boumediene functional model is "the
nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took
place." 20 8 Unlike the first factor, the circuit court found that the
analysis of the second factor weighs heavily in favor of the
government position.20 9  The circuit court conceded that the
petitioners in Eisentrager, Boumediene, and Al Maqaleh were all
apprehended abroad; 210 however, the court argued that the weight
of the second factor turns on the nature of the detention location."
While the court stressed that "de facto sovereignty is not
determinative," 2 12 the court also acknowledged that the nature of
the detention site is highly relevant in deciding the reach of the
Suspension Clause.2 13 For the circuit court, the second factor
turned on the extent of de jure control exercised by the United
States over the detention area.214 Unlike in Boumediene, the
were "not trivial." Id For detainees held at Bagram, an "Unlawful Enemy Combatant
Review Board" (UECRB) determines a detainee's status. Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 96.
UECRB proceedings "afford even less protection to the rights of detainees in the
determination of status than was the case with the CSRT." Id.
205 Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 96.
206 See Amicus Brief, supra note 59, at 10-11, 2009 WL 6043979 at *16.
207 See infra Part IV.C.2.
208 Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 96 (internal quotation marks omitted).
209 Id
210 Id.
211 Id. at 97.
212 Id.
213 Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 97.
214 See id.
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detainees at Bagram are held at a facility under the open invitation
of the Afghani host government through a temporary leasehold
agreement.2 15 In other words, the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is
at the invitation of the de jure sovereign. As a result, it cannot be
argued that the U.S. presence at Bagram is somehow standing in
opposition to the de jure sovereign and establishing de facto
sovereignty.2 16 Further distinguishable from Guantanamo Bay,
there is no demonstrated intent to establish a permanent American
presence at the base.2 17 As a result, the court found that "the
notion that de facto sovereignty extends to Bagram is no more real
than would have been the same claim with respect to Landsberg in
the Eisentrager case."218 Determining that the second factor
weighs in favor of the government, the court stated that this
finding is still not outcome-determinative.2 19
3. The Practical Problems ofHaving Courts Validate
Detention
As to "the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the
prisoner's entitlement to the writ," the circuit court found this third
factor to "weigh[] overwhelmingly in favor of the position of the
United States."220 Whereas the first two Boumediene factors seem
to have canceled each other out, the circuit court indicated that the
third factor is the central test for extending the writ.22 ' The court
analyzed the third factor using largely the same approach as it
used with the second factor: the court distinguished Guantanamo
Bay and ruled that the Bagram facts more closely parallel
Landsberg.22 2
In distinguishing Bagram and Landsberg from Guantanamo
Bay, the circuit court highlighted the finding in Boumediene that
215 The Circuit Court found it highly relevant that Guantanamo Bay is under the
complete and total control of the U.S. government despite the fact that Cuba, a nation
hostile to the United States, maintains "dejure sovereignty over the property." Id.
216 Id.
217 Id
218 Al Maqaleh H, 605 F.3d at 97.
219 Id.
220 Id
221 See id. at 97-98.
222 Id. at 97.
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threats similar to those at Landsberg were entirely lacking at
Guantanamo Bay.223 Far removed from an active theater of war,
Guantanamo Bay lacked the practical concerns that existed at
Landsberg for extending the writ.2 24  Guantanamo Bay is also
distinguishable in that the United States is the de facto sovereign
over the naval base despite being "within the territory of another
de jure sovereign." 22 5 These two distinctions made Guantanamo
Bay very different from Landsberg in Boumediene, and the circuit
court saw these distinctions as even further distinguishing the
situation at Bagram.2 26
While hostilities had ended at the time of the Eisentrager
decision, "many of the problems of a theater of war remained." 2 27
With Bagram being located within an active theater of war, the
court found the actual threats of an ongoing war make the
government position even stronger than that of the post-War
Eisentrager case.228 The circuit court noted that the concerns of
the Eisentrager Court echo more forcefully in circumstances of an
actual ongoing war.229 In Afghanistan, the American-led coalition
and ISAF forces face daily security threats from a present enemy,
not a defeated foe.230 Similarly, providing judicial process to
enemy aliens would be a "conflict between judicial and military
opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United States." 23 1 In
addressing the practical concerns of the third Boumediene factor,
the circuit court took into account the overall strategic military
concerns in conducting ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan.23 2
223 Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 97.
224 See id. at 97-98.
225 Id. at 98.
226 See id.
227 The Eisentrager court expressed concern over "judicial interference with the
military's efforts to contain 'enemy elements, guerilla fighters, and 'were-wolves."'
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769-70 (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784).
228 See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 97-98.
229 See id at 98.
230 See id.
231 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779.
232 See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 97-98.
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D. District Court ofD.C.: Why Bagram Might Be Like
Guantanamo
While reversed by the circuit court, the analysis of the Al
Maqaleh petitioners' situation in Judge Bates's district court ruling
is important for laying out the competing argument that a United
States federal court has jurisdiction to hear habeas claims out of
Bagram. Because the Supreme Court may agree with the district
court's findings, it is important to understand where and how the
two opinions differ in their legal analysis. For this reason, the
discussion of Judge Bates's opinion is limited to areas in which
the district court opinion yielded opposite legal conclusions than
in the circuit court.233
In the district court application of the Boumediene three-factor
test, Judge Bates divided the original three factors into six tests.234
Like Chief Judge Sentelle's circuit court opinion, Judge Bates
found that 1) the citizenship of the detainees; 2) the status of the
detainees; and 3) the site of apprehension for the Al Maqaleh
detainees were no different than for the Boumediene petitioners.23 5
Also similar to the circuit court opinion, Judge Bates found the
adequacy of process at Bagram to be much more lacking than at
Landsberg or even at Guantanamo Bay.2 36 While both the district
and appellate courts agree that these factors either mirror the status
of the Boumediene petitioners or even amplify support for
extending the writ, the agreement within the opinions ends
there.237 The two opinions have divergent views regarding the site
of detention and the practical obstacles in extending the writ.2 38
233 See generally Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (providing the full opinion of
Judge Bates).
234 Id. at 215 ("For the sake of analysis, [the] three [Boumediene] factors can be
subdivided further into six: (1) the citizenship of the detainee; (2) the status of the
detainee; (3) the adequacy of process through which the status determination was made;
(4) the nature of the site of apprehension; (5) the nature of the site of detention; and (6)
the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the petitioner's entitlement to the writ.").
235 See id. at 217-18.
236 Id. at 226-27.
237 Compare Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 96-97, with Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d
at 222-23.
238 Compare Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 96-97, with Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d
at 222-23.
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1. Bagram Looks Similar to Guantanamo
Both the circuit court and district court agree that Boumediene
requires that a "site of detention" analysis include inquiry into
both the "duration" and "degree" of U.S. control over the
detention site.239 In fact, both opinions agree that the United States
has not manifested intent to remain at Bagram indefinitely, as in
the case of Guantanamo Bay.2 40 The divergence in legal thought,
therefore, concerns the "degree" to which the United States
exercises control over Bagram as compared to Guantanamo Bay.
The circuit court gives significant deference to the fact that the
Bagram facility is operated at the invitation of the host, de jure
sovereign through a leasehold agreement. 24 1 As mentioned above,
this legal determination is distinguishable from Guantanamo Bay
where the United States has maintained de facto control of the
naval base for over a century notwithstanding a hostile de jure
242sovereign. In framing its "degree" analysis, the district court
goes into a lengthy analysis of specific provisions of the Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the American and Afghan
governments, which regulates, among other things, Bagram
Airfield.243 Using specific provisions of the SOFA and the lease
agreement for Bagram, Judge Bates makes it clear that the United
States has overwhelming authority to regulate Bagram as it
chooses.244 The district court then goes on to state that "when
assessing day-to-day activities at Bagram, the lack of complete
'jurisdiction' does not appreciably undermine the conclusion that
239 Compare Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 96-97, with Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d
at 221-22.
240 Compare Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 97 ("In Bagram, while the United States has
options as to duration of the lease agreement, there is no indication of any intent to
occupy the base with permanence."), with Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 225 ("As to
the duration of the U.S. presence. . . Bagram appears to be closer to Landsberg than
Guantanamo-the United States has been at Bagram for less than a decade and has
disavowed any intention of a permanent presence there.").
241 See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 97.
242 See id.
243 See Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 222-24.
244 See id. at 222-23 ("[P]aragraph 9 of the [Bagram] lease grants the United States
exclusive use of the premises at Bagram .... [Paragraph 4 of] the Bagram lease provides
the United States with assignment and reversion authority . . . . Under [Paragraph 7 ofj
the SOFA, the United States has criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel.").
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the United States exercises a very high 'objective degree of
control. ,,245
This argument, while true from an "on the ground analysis,"
leapfrogs and dismisses the central distinction between
Guantanamo Bay and Bagram, namely, the circumstances under
which the American presence in each respective base is achieved.
Strained relations continue to exist between Cuba and the United
States. 246 The fact that a hostile government constitutes only a
latent threat24 7 does not erode the distinction between Guantanamo
Bay and Bagram. Afghanistan continues to support an American
presence within its borders.248 Absent a change to this Afghan
position, it cannot be successfully argued that the United States
has asserted any real de facto control of Bagram.2 49
Ultimately, Judge Bates stops short of concluding that Bagram,
like Guantanamo Bay, is "not abroad;" however, the district court
opinion does find that the United States exercises a high degree of
objective control over Bagram.2 50  This weighs in favor of
extending the writ, but not to the same extent as in Boumediene.2 5 1
Judge Bates waivers in deciding whether the government or the Al
Maqaleh petitioners ultimately benefits from this finding.252 By
incorporating a thorough treatment of the de jure and de facto
sovereignty,25 3 the circuit court provided a better mechanism for
determining whether the detention site favored the government or
the petitioners under the Boumediene second factor test.
2. Practically No Obstacles
Whereas the circuit court finds that hostilities surrounding
Bagram necessitated more deference to the executive and its
ongoing military operations, the district court found that the
practical procedural obstacles could be overcome with modern
245 Id. at 223 (citations omitted).
246 See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 97.
247 See id.
248 See id.
249 See id.
250 See Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 231.
251 See id
252 See id.
253 See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 96-97.
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technology.2 54 In Boumediene, assessing practical obstacles was a
matter of "focusing on the impact that habeas review would have
on the military mission and on whether litigating habeas cases
would cause friction with the host government." 25 5 Thus, practical
concerns under Boumediene turn on the impact on "host country
relations" and on the "military mission." 2 56 Because the discussion
of "host country relations" primarily involved the possibility of
friction between the United States and Afghan governments
concerning Afghan citizens, this segment of the district court
opinion is not discussed.2 57 At the appellate level, the only Afghan
citizen among the original Al Maqaleh petitioners is excluded
because of this "host friction."25 8
Judge Bates sees the practical concerns relating to the
"military mission" as little more than a question of capability. 2 59
The district court finds that despite Bagram being located within
an active theater of war, the Bagram detention facility is a
"secure" location. 260 Addressing the issue of in-court appearances
for detainees, the court stresses that "[r]eal-time video-
conferencing provides a workable substitute for an in-court
appearance." 26 1' The mitigating factors that Judge Bates presents in
order to calm practical concerns are facially valid; however, the
district court analysis is ultimately a well-intentioned "tactical"
assessment of the "military mission."2 62  Concentrating on the
actual on-the-ground capability to put on habeas proceedings
ignores the strategic considerations that the government has for
not extending habeas to an active theater of war. 263 The Court
expressed in Eisentrager these strategic concerns:
254 See Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
255 Id. at 227 (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769-70).
256 Id.
257 See id. at 229.
258 For a complete discussion of the "host friction" issue, see id. at 229-31.
259 See Al Maqaleh I, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
260 See id.
261 Id.
262 See generally id. at 228-31 (discussing the relationship between providing
habeas corpus hearings and the military mission in Afghanistan).
263 See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 98.
2011] 543
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and
comfort to the enemy. They would diminish the prestige of our
commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering neutrals.
It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field
commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to
reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil
courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military
offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home. Nor is it
unlikely that the result of such enemy litigiousness would be a
conflict between judicial and military opinion highly comforting
to enemies of the United States.264
These post-War concerns are even more relevant during an
active ongoing conflict.2 65 The circuit court is arguably implying
that, at Bagram, the military mission would be hampered if its
detention powers were constantly subject to judicial oversight.2 66
Where "the vagaries of war are present," then "arguments that
issuing the writ would be impractical or anomalous" are entitled to
more deference.26 7 In Boumediene, these "practical" concerns
were not present. 268  Far removed from the battlefield, the
"military mission" analysis at Guantanamo Bay could turn on
Judge Bates's "tactical" assessment of the military mission.2 69
V. Moving Forward: Options for AlMaqaleh
Petitioners
Currently, the Al Maqaleh petitioners have two options for
overturning the D.C. Circuit Court opinion. Both options,
however, are unlikely to yield an unfavorable result for the
government. The first option available to the petitioners would be
to ask the D.C. Circuit to reconsider the case en banc. 27 0 This
option, if the D.C. Circuit agreed to reexamine the case, is unlikely
to change the outcome. Because the original three-judge panel
264 Id. (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779).
265 See id.
266 See id.
267 Id. at 97-98 (internal quotation marks omitted).
268 See Al Maqaleh II 605 F.3d at 97.
269 See id.
270 See D.C. CIR. R. 35(b).
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was unanimous despite being composed of judges of varied
political ideologies,27 ' an en banc opinion may only yield a similar
result.
Should the Al Maqaleh petitioners file for certiorari in the
Supreme Court, they would face a daunting uphill battle to reverse
the D.C. Circuit Court opinion. Al Maqaleh is one of the first
cases to apply the Boumediene three-factor functional model.272
Boumediene itself was a 5-4 opinion.27 3 Thus, it would be very
unlikely that any of the four Boumediene dissenters2 7 4 would find
that habeas extends to Bagram when they rejected extending
habeas to Guantanamo Bay. Of the remaining five justices, Elena
Kagan would likely recuse herself due to her involvement in the Al
Maqaleh case when she served as Solicitor General.275 This would
leave, at most, four justices to equal out the four likely opponents
of extending habeas to the Al Maqaleh detainees held at
Bagram.2 76 As a matter of Supreme Court procedure, a 4-4 tie has
the effect of an affirmance of the circuit court's ruling.277
VI. Conclusion: Implications of the Al Maqaleh
Application of Boumediene
It now appears that the reasoning underlying the D.C. Circuit
Court opinion in Al Maqaleh v. Gates will stand for the
foreseeable future. In the first application of the Boumediene
three-factor functional approach, the D.C. Circuit found that
271 See Denniston, supra note 21.
272 See Al Maqaleh 1, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 207-08.
273 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 730.
274 Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, dissented
in Boumediene. Id.
275 Justice Kagan still served as Solicitor General of the United States at the time the
government's Brief for Respondents-Appellants was filed. Reply Brief for Respondents-
Appellants, Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Nos. 09-5265, 09-5266, 09-
5267). Her involvement in the case would make her participation in deciding Al
Maqaleh should it come to the High Court is, thus, very unlikely. See Faiza Patel, The
Writ Stops Here: No Habeas for Prisoners Held by US. Forces in Afghanistan, ASIL
INSIGHT (Am. Soc'y of Int'l L.), June 3, 2010, available at
http://www.asil.org/files/insightl00603pdf.pdf.
276 Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the court, and Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer wrote or joined in separate concurring opinions. Boumediene, 553
U.S. at 730.
277 See Patel, supra note 275.
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federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear the Bagram
detainees' petitions for habeas corpus.278 Whether the petitioners
choose to request the D.C. Circuit to examine the case en banc or
appeal directly to the Supreme Court, a reversal of the original
circuit opinion is unlikely. While the Boumediene functional
approach does lay the groundwork for deciding the extraterritorial
reach of the writ, the test is "so inherently subjective that it clears
a wide path for the Court[s] to traverse in the years to come."27 9
278 See Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d at 99.
279 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 843 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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